Irish Peace Process

In November of 1986 Martin McGuinness, a senior member of Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, commented at the IRA's ard-ftheis (annual conference):

They will tell you that the war against British rule will be run down. Shame-shame-shame. Our position is clear and it will never, never, never change: the war against British rule must continue until freedom is achieved. [1]

Only eight years later in 1994 the IRA declared a complete cessation of military operations, abruptly halting thirty years of guerrilla warfare in an attempt to achieve a united Ireland via constitutional means. The modern “troubles” in Northern Ireland began in the late 1960's and early 70's with Catholic civil rights protests and an escalation of violence that lead to the formation of the modern Irish Republican Army (IRA). During the 1970's and 80's, the IRA approached the struggle with a long-term perspective. The IRA was prepared for the long war, and nothing short of full military victory over the British would be accepted. How then did the IRA evolve in the ensuing years so that they would abandon the armed struggle for the political struggle? Between the 1970's and 1994 the IRA gradually shifted away from military to political means in the quest for a united Ireland. During these years the IRA and Sinn Fein leadership came to a realization that the nature of the troubles had changed. Pressure from the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) to form a nationalist front combined with the increased military pressure from unionist paramilitary organizations in the early 90's, forced a realization by the IRA that their goals were not being achieved and public opinion had turned against them. These realizations resulted in the 1994 IRA cease-fire that laid the groundwork for the groundbreaking Good Friday Agreement of 1998.

The leaders of the IRA that would eventually embrace the peace process had declared all-out war on British Imperialism in the 1970's and 80's. The leadership consisted of a core group of Northern nationalists from humble working class backgrounds. Gerry Adams, Martin McGuiness and Danny Morrison took control of the IRA in the late 1970's in an internal coup. The pre-existing leadership of southern nationalists Ruairi O Bradaigh and Daithi O Conaill had been severely criticized by the Adams faction for a failed cease-fire against the British in the mid 70's. Adams and McGuiness claimed that the O Bradaigh faction had been “duped by the British”, and in the process almost lost the war by allowing British troops to regroup and inflict increased casualties on IRA units [2]. The new leadership under the young Gerry Adams prepared for the long fight that would last perhaps decades or longer in order to achieve nothing less than a united Ireland.

Adams and the IRA, at this time, believed that military means provided the only avenue for the freedom of the Irish people over British Imperialism. The IRA fully believed that they were engaging in an anti-colonial, anti-imperial war against Britain [3]. The long history of Irish Nationalism had embraced armed struggle as one of the only options for fighting the British and Unionist monopoly on political power. Thus it was no surprise that the nationalist community in the north and south of Ireland saw the IRA as a somewhat legitimate organization.

The evolution of the IRA from a military organization to an increasingly political one began in 1981 after a hunger strike campaign by IRA and Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) prisoners at Long Kesh prison. The much-publicized strike resulted in the deaths of nine republicans and lead to an outpouring of nationalist support from the Catholic community in the north and south [4]. Adams realized that in order to capitalize fully on the swelling of the IRA ranks, he would have to adopt some form of ‘electoralism'. Many potential IRA members were unwilling to participate directly in the violence, yet were enthusiastic to aid the nationalist cause through constitutional means. The IRA made an active decision to utilize their little used political wing, Sinn Fein, in electoral politics to benefit from the public favor they had gained by the hunger strike. Adams had long been skeptical that any participation in politics would lessen the prestige and power of the IRA, but saw the opportunity in 1981 as too momentous to overlook.

The entry into politics by Sinn Fein marked a turning point in republican leadership. The IRA considered themselves revolutionaries, but it can be said that once revolutionaries enter politics they cease to be revolutionaries. Internal debates among Sinn Fein members arose hereafter regarding the level of importance that Sinn Fein would play, and whether political or military means should weigh greater in the IRA decision-making.

Sinn Fein basked in the post hunger strike electoral success, but after 1985 suffered significant setbacks that challenged their guerrilla warfare tactics. Between 1982 and 1985 Sinn Fein fielded candidates for the Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont and consistently won 40% of the nationalist vote and 12% overall in Northern Ireland [5]. However Sinn Fein's policy of abstention from the Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont (being that the government was illegitimate) resulted in a loss of public support after 1985. Nationalists saw no reason to elect Sinn Fein members who would abstain from Parliament when the Social Democratic Labour Party provided an alternative nationalist vote that would provide a voice in Parliament.

The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 also served as a setback to violent nationalism and the IRA. The IRA had long argued that the British remained in Northern Ireland due to exploitative intentions and that the war against the British was a colonial struggle. The signing of the Agreement challenged the colonial struggle notion put forth by the IRA and changed the nature of the troubles in Northern Ireland. The agreement allowed for the status of Northern Ireland to change with the majority consent of its people and had significant nationalist undertones [6]. The document appeared to acknowledge the British realization that Northern Ireland would not remain a part of the United Kingdom forever. The document stood in opposition to the IRA claims of British Imperialism and blind devotion to the Union, while symbolically supporting new arguments regarding the nature of the struggle argued by the SDLP and their leader, John Hume.

Hume had claimed since the 70's that the British were neutral in regards to Northern Ireland's future, and that instead the Unionists were the force presenting the opposition to a united Ireland [7]. The Anglo-Irish Agreement, while not outwardly stating support of Hume's assertions, appeared to credit his argument. Many in the IRA were still reluctant to admit British neutrality in regards to Northern Ireland, but the agreement certainly showed that London was willing to bargain and work with the opposition. If London could negotiate, then was warfare the best answer to ending the partition of Ireland?

Many nationalists pondered the cloudy future of Northern Ireland that saw no end in sight to paramilitary violence. John Hume and the SDLP meanwhile saw an opening. Hume hoped persuade the IRA to abandon their long war strategy against the British and join the SDLP in a pan-nationalist political front. In 1988 Father Alec Reid, who attempted to convince the SDLP that IRA leadership was open to alternatives to the armed struggle, had approached Hume. After a series of conversations with Father Reid, Hume agreed to meet with Adams and the IRA leadership in a historic meeting that would begin a relationship with the two most influential personalities in Irish Nationalism. Hume was to use the Anglo-Irish Agreement as leverage with the IRA in convincing them that the political landscape had changed enough since the 1970's that constitutional nationalism was a more effective path than military aggression against the British and loyalists.

The meeting between the SDLP and Sinn Fein bridged few gaps initially, but opened up critical lines of communications that would allow a Sinn Fein and SDLP front to emerge years later. At the first meeting Hume stressed the uselessness of violence, and that IRA objectives were no closer to being achieved in fifteen plus years of warfare. In addition, the SDLP representatives stressed the increasingly flexible stance the British were taking as shown in the Anglo-Irish Agreement, that proved more progress could be made with an IRA cease-fire and Sinn Fein at the negotiating table. Sinn Fein, led by Adams, Danny Morrison and Mitchell McLaughlin, still contested the claims of the effectiveness of electoralism and the so-called neutrality of the British position, but nonetheless, emerged from the negotiations willing to sit down for further talks with the SDLP leadership.

While Sinn Fein continued closed-door negotiations with the SDLP through the late 80's and early 90's, their popularity dwindled and the IRA suffered numerous public relations disasters relating to their indiscriminate use of violence. In November of 1987 an IRA bomb at Enniskillen killed eleven Protestants who had gathered for the annual Poppy day parade [8]. The IRA had intended the bomb for British soldiers, when it had not detonated, the IRA took no actions to warn locals of the bomb. In addition the IRA offered no public apology which lead to an increased public condemnation of IRA violence. The Enniskillen bombing resulted in acute criticism of the IRA from not only unionists and British, but from the Dublin government, the international community and many nationalists as well.

Another public relations fiasco in 1987 worsened the already poor public image of the IRA. In November of 1987 French authorities off the Brittany coast seized an IRA arms shipment headed for the North. The shipment contained 150 tons of military equipment (Kalishnikov rifles, Semtex plastic explosive, rocket launchers, surface-to-air missiles), so much equipment that authorities were initially convinced that the shipment was to be split between the IRA and militant Basques in Spain [9]. In reality, the shipment was bound in its entirety for Northern Ireland. Authorities in the North were relieved at first to have caught the shipment, only to discover in interrogation that four previous shipments from of the same size had been smuggled into Northern Ireland. The Irish and British Governments were previously unaware of the vast military strength of the IRA. The IRA had an army that could challenge the might of the Irish army.

The level of IRA violence, combined with the indiscriminate killing of protestant civilians at Enniskillen and the seizure of IRA arms, alienated the Dublin government and the southern community from Sinn Fein and the IRA cause. Instead of forging a unified Irish nationalist identity, the IRA was driving a wedge between northern and southern nationalists with the high level of carnage. The IRA was serving to discredit the entire northern nationalist cause. Furthermore, the IRA violence while dividing northern and southern nationalists, was driving Dublin and London closer together in order to gain a viable peace. The public in Ireland and Britain was generally horrified by the IRA's killing of innocent civilians, and potential for beginning a full-scale conflict with Britain (or with Ireland). The IRA's public relations problems forced them re-evaluate their commitment to the armed struggle.

By the early 1990's the IRA war had been ongoing for twenty years, yet it was unclear of the IRA was any closer to its goal of one Ireland. On the contrary, many in the SDLP argued that IRA efforts had only worsened the nationalist cause and forced London to increase their nominal support for the unionist case. The IRA had long been discredited by many forces within the Irish government, and only made their case worse with the increasing level of violence that would peak in 1993. And if the IRA had in fact facilitated Dublin and London to jointly tackle the Northern Ireland problem than the IRA was taking steps backwards towards achieving a united Ireland. It was unclear whether Sinn Fein and the IRA were winning the war, which was complicated by the intensification of Loyalist paramilitary action.

In the early 1992 and 1993 Loyalist paramilitary organizations killed more Catholics than the IRA killed Protestants, the first time the Unionists had surpassed the Nationalists in casualties in the modern troubles [10]. The Loyalists were matching the IRA intensification of violence, showing the IRA that the Protestant community would not go quietly from Ireland or the Northern Ireland problem. It became apparent to reasonable men in the IRA that the Unionists were going to have to play a part in efforts toward peace and deserved at least some say in the status of Northern Ireland in the future. If the IRA was unwilling to grant even minor concessions to the Protestant community, then the Protestant paramilitary organizations like the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) were prepared to fight every bit as hard as the IRA. With the prospect of a prolonged war with Unionist paramilitary groups and the British on the horizon, the IRA felt further prompted to use negotiations and political pressure rather than military pressure.

While the IRA grew increasingly isolated for its use of violence, the SDLP and John Hume had been continuing negotiations with Sinn Fein and Gerry Adams for several years. Between the first SDLP-Sinn Fein meeting in 1988 the talks had been steadily gaining ground. Despite an IRA escalation in violence many observed the growing importance of Sinn Fein within the IRA. A 1992 IRA document “Towards a Lasting Peace” reflected the changing position and growing flexibility of the Sinn Fein. “Towards a lasting Peace” attempted to label, address and answer the problems facing Northern Ireland in a more realistic way than the past. Furthermore, the IRA, while not accepting the neutrality of Britain, did acknowledge the progress made by the British government [11].

Adams and Sinn Fein had slowly become a more viable political option in the eyes of many nationalists in the north and south, as well as internationally. Adams had been working to gain international favor, as reflected in a historic tour of the United States in January of 1994, in which he hoped to rally support from the Irish-American community for Sinn Fein initiatives toward peace. In addition, the IRA had for many years now been using Sinn Fein in negotiations with Dublin and the SDLP. Talks were not going to proceed any further with Sinn Fein unless the IRA called a ceasefire, allowing for diplomacy without the threat of violent retribution. By 1994 Adams and McGuinness were prepared to initiate a cease fire, the only problem lay in convincing the thousands of IRA volunteers that a cease fire could attain IRA objectives without losing the war.

For many IRA volunteers, like those in heavily nationalist South Armaugh and West Belfast, the IRA was not just a terrorist organization, but also a way of life. The modern IRA was formed to defend Catholics against the British and Loyalist violence in the 1970's, and later took the offensive against the British occupation. Attacks by murderous Protestant mobs Catholic neighborhoods of Belfast in the early 1970's provided motivation for Catholics to create a defense force that would replace the majority protestant and sectarian Royal Ulster Constabulary. The IRA served as an offensive and defensive army to Catholics.

Many South Armaugh nationalists doubted whether a ceasefire could bring the IRA any closer to its goals. In South Armaugh, where nationalism was a religion, the IRA had arguably as much sway as the Catholic Church itself. The IRA regularly initiated attacks on British soldiers in the area. For the citizens of South Armaugh the violence was accepted as part of the long process of Irish armed resistance and Irish freedom fighting. Many in South Armaugh questioned whether the Sinn Fein and IRA leadership were selling out to British and Unionist political strength [12]. In the end, splinter organizations like the Real IRA emerged and maintained violent actions against British soldiers and innocent civilians. The Omaugh bombing in 1998 by the Real IRA, which killed 29 civilians reflected divides within nationalism that still had not healed. [13]

Despite internal bickering, the majority of those in the IRA and Sinn Fein stayed loyal to Adams and adopted the IRA ceasefire of 1994. Thirty years of violence had worn down the will of many fighters to maintain a war, peace by diplomacy provided a feasible alternative. The IRA had come a long way since Adams and McGuinness seized power in 1977, and those in power in Sinn Fein gradually phased out the long war mentality. Only Adams and McGuinness, men with impeccable Nationalist credentials could have convinced the IRA that negotiations and not guns were the best way to achieve a united Ireland. Yet Adams and McGuiness needed convincing themselves, during their twenty odd years in the IRA, numerous outside influences help prod the IRA towards adopting a ceasefire.

Pressure applied on Sinn Fein by the SDLP, Loyalist paramilitary organizations, and by public opinion, forced Sinn Fein to re-evaluate the long war strategy. Adams and Sinn Fein questioned whether their objectives were being attained in the face of such opposition to the IRA. Northern Ireland and its political landscape had evolved since the 1970's, and the IRA's outdated belligerent mentality was not gaining ground. By the late 1980's Sinn Fein was ready to begin a process of de-militarization that would take years to accomplish, but would culminate in the 1994 ceasefire. The Adams-Sinn Fein leadership that was so critical of a failed cease-fire in the 70's became the leadership in the 1990's that abandoned the armed struggle for the negotiating table. The Sinn Fein leadership deserves credit for re-assessing the Northern Ireland situation, and abandoning outdated methods of warfare for a diplomatic option that provides hope for the people of Northern Ireland. Their efforts were rewarded in the historic Good Friday Agreement of 1998.

—Tara Broughel
broughel@yahoo.com

Notes

1. Mallie, Eamonn and McKittrick, David. The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story behind the Irish Peace Process. (London: Heinemann, 1996). P. 29.
2. Mallie and McKittrick, p. 12.
3. Ibid, p. 34.
4. Ibid, p. 20.
5. Mallie and McKittrick. P. 21.
6. Mallie and McKittrick, p. 29-30.
7. Ibid, p. 32.
8. Mallie and McKittrick, p. 57.
9. Mallie and McKittrick. P. 60.
10. Taylor, Peter. Loyalists . (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1999). P. 214.
11. Mallie and McKittrick, p. 138-39.
12. Harden, Toby. Bandit Country: The IRA and South Armaugh . (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1999). P. 310.
13. Harnden, p. 316.

What's Related

Story Options